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RE-READING CHEVRON 
THOMAS W. MERRILL† 
ABSTRACT 
Though increasingly disfavored by the Supreme Court, Chevron 
remains central to administrative law doctrine. This Article suggests a 
way for the Court to reformulate the Chevron doctrine without 
overruling the Chevron decision. Through careful attention to the 
language of Chevron itself, the Court can honor the decision’s 
underlying value of harnessing comparative institutional advantage in 
judicial review, while setting aside a highly selective reading that unduly 
narrows judicial review. This re-reading would put the Chevron 
doctrine—and with it, an entire branch of administrative law—on 
firmer footing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 is, 
if not the most important decision in administrative law, certainly the 
most cited.2 It is also one of the most criticized. Academic grousing is 
one thing, but Chevron seems also to have lost favor with the Supreme 
Court. The Justices generally identified as conservative—some of 
them, anyway—appear willing to overrule or at least limit the decision, 
with principles of stare decisis temporizing their willingness to varying 
extents. The Justices generally identified as liberal are presumably 
more supportive, although they are reluctant to invoke Chevron for 
fear of what the conservatives might do in response. These calculations 
are complicated by the addition of the newest member of the Court, 
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, who has yet to be heard from on Chevron. 
The result, for now, is a kind of paralysis on the Court with respect to 
the status of Chevron. The Court has not relied on the Chevron 
doctrine to uphold an agency interpretation of law for four years.3 The 
obvious evasion has prompted Justice Samuel Alito to remark that 
“the Court, for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron,” which he 
characterized as “an important, frequently invoked, once celebrated, 
and now increasingly maligned precedent.”4 
The Court cannot ignore Chevron forever. The decision is far too 
central to administrative law. Agencies, lower courts, and lawyers need 
guidance about its status. This Article suggests how the Court might 
reformulate the Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron 
decision. That move requires distinguishing between the doctrine and 
the decision. This Article argues they are not the same. The Chevron 
decision should be allowed to stand; indeed, it can be upheld as an 
instructive example of how judges should review agency 
interpretations of the statutes they administer. The Chevron doctrine, 
in contrast, is based on two paragraphs in the Chevron decision, taking 
 
 1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking 
Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 n.2 (2014). 
 3. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136, 2142 (2016) (relying on 
Chevron to uphold an interpretation of the Patent Office about the scope of construction of 
patents on inter partes review). 
 4. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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those paragraphs out of context and elevating them into a mechanical 
doctrine that fails to reflect the broader traditions of administrative 
law.5 By reading the Chevron decision as a whole, the “increasingly 
maligned” doctrine can be recast in a way that is more faithful to the 
values of judicial review and puts this branch of administrative law on 
sounder footing.  
This Article will not appeal to those who would abolish all 
deference to agency interpretations of law, insisting that only Article 
III courts are entitled to “say what the law is.”6 Nor will it appeal to 
those who believe the modern pace of social change requires that 
agencies replace Congress and the courts as the primary sources of 
legal norms.7 It embraces the notion that judicial review of agency legal 
interpretations should be structured in such a way as to emphasize the 
comparative strengths of both courts and agencies as institutions. 
Broadly speaking, it assumes that courts have a comparative advantage 
in enforcing the rule of law and constitutional values, and that agencies 
have a comparative advantage in reconciling conflicting policy 
objectives.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly sketches four values 
that should be advanced by a regime that divides authority to interpret 
the law between agencies and courts. Part II considers the Supreme 
Court’s unanimous Chevron decision and demonstrates that most of 
the decision is highly consistent with the four values identified in Part 
I. Part III turns to two paragraphs that appear in an introductory 
section of the Chevron opinion, and argues that these paragraphs, at 
least as they came to be interpreted, are significantly at odds with these 
values. Part IV then offers some thoughts about how the Court could 
revise the Chevron doctrine by returning to the Chevron decision and 
reaffirming it, as it stands in its entirety, as the proper foundation for a 
system of judicial review.  
 
 5. Infra Parts I.E. & III.  
 6. E.g., PETER J. WALLISON, JUDICIAL FORTITUDE: THE LAST CHANCE TO REIN IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE x (2018). The quoted reference is from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803): “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.” 
 7. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 2–3 (2016) (arguing that only agencies have the capacity to respond in 
a timely and informed manner to unanticipated social crises). 
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I.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FOUR VALUES 
Judicial review of questions of law performs multiple functions. 
This Part offers a brief sketch of four values widely regarded as being 
important in the context of judicial review of statutory interpretations 
by administrative agencies—the process to which the Chevron doctrine 
speaks.8  
A. Rule-of-Law Values 
Because we are considering the interpretation of law, it makes 
sense that the regime of judicial review should promote the rule of law. 
The concept of the “rule of law” has multiple meanings.9 At its core, it 
refers to the benefit of having stable expectations about what the law 
requires, both in terms of what individuals are allowed to do and what 
the government is allowed to do in its interactions with individuals. 
Stability of expectations is good because it makes life more predictable. 
Predictability is good because it promotes security, makes planning for 
the future possible, encourages investment, and gives individuals the 
freedom to pursue their aspirations within the space established by 
these stable expectations.10 
One extremely important set of settled expectations is the 
understanding that American law is defined by a hierarchy of legal 
authority. At the top sits the Constitution, below that are the many 
statutes that have been enacted by Congress, and below that are the 
even more numerous regulations and orders issued by administrative 
agencies. The Constitution trumps statutes, and statutes trump agency 
regulations and orders. This understanding is not set forth in any 
foundational document. The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause speaks 
of both the Constitution and federal statutes as the “supreme Law of 
the Land” without differentiating between them and, further, makes 
no mention of agency regulations and orders.11 The hierarchy of legal 
 
 8. The four values are discussed at greater length in THOMAS W. MERRILL, TO SAY WHAT 
THE LAW IS: THE SUPREME COURT’S CHEVRON DOCTRINE AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at ch. 1) (on file with the Author). 
 9. See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 
21 LAW & PHIL. 137–40 (2002) (noting that the common usage of the term “rule of law” diverges 
from its technical and philosophical meaning and that, from its inception, there has been little 
consensus around the term’s meaning).  
 10. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–94 (rev. ed. 1969) (summarizing 
the virtues of the rule of law); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY 
OF LAW 210, 220 (2d ed. 2009) (similar). 
 11. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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authority is grounded in settled expectations about how the American 
legal order is organized.  
It is important to note that the rule of law—in the sense of stability 
of expectations about the law—is not the only value society should 
promote. It is possible to imagine a society that scrupulously observes 
the rule of law and yet is pervasively racist, highly inefficient, or 
generates large inequalities in wealth. The fact that rule-of-law values 
can coexist with injustice and other unfavorable conditions means that 
stability of expectations should, on appropriate occasions, give way to 
legal change. The question is whether judicial review can help strike a 
proper balance between stability of expectations and accommodating 
desired change in the law. 
Here, a notable difference between agencies and courts becomes 
relevant. Courts by their very nature are designed to reinforce stability 
of expectations. The primary function of courts is to resolve disputes. 
The very legitimacy of courts in performing this function is the 
perception of the parties that the norms courts invoke in resolving 
these disputes are grounded in existing law.12 Moreover, courts by 
institutional design are independent of direct political control. Federal 
judges enjoy secure compensation and can be removed from office only 
by impeachment.13 This high degree of independence is thought to 
encourage judges to resolve disputes according to settled law, rather 
than according to the preferences of the incumbent president or 
members of Congress. 
When it comes to statutory interpretation, courts nearly always 
seek to determine the best or, at least, the settled meaning of the 
relevant statute. In other words, they seek the meaning that other 
participants in the legal system, as advised by their lawyers, most likely 
understand to be the law. Courts—as a rule—understand that it is the 
legislature’s job to make policy and the court’s job to serve as a faithful 
agent carrying out the instructions of the legislature. Courts are also 
far more likely to adhere to settled expectations when extrapolating 
from prior precedent to resolve a new question.14 In any area of law 
 
 12. Thomas W. Merrill, Legitimate Interpretation—Or Legitimate Adjudication?, 105 
CORNELL L. REV. 1395, 1407–08 (2020). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 14.  Vertical stare decisis in the federal system is generally understood to be quite strong. 
See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 
(2016) (citing authorities supporting the strict rule of vertical stare decisis and discussing examples 
of lower courts narrowing or extending Supreme Court precedent). Horizontal stare decisis is 
considered less strong, but nonetheless the Court frequently adheres to a presumption against 
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that is largely governed by precedent, the courts’ authority to compel 
obedience from the parties is, in significant part, driven by the sense 
that they adhere to precedents authoritatively rendered in the past. 
Courts occasionally overrule precedents. More commonly, they 
narrow or expand on them. But they almost never disregard a 
controlling precedent that has been called to their attention.  
Agencies present a much less reassuring picture when it comes to 
enforcing settled expectations about the law. Some agencies, like the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), use the dispute-resolution 
function to make policy, which often results in ideological shifts from 
one administration to the next, oscillating between pro-labor and pro-
management perspectives.15 Similarly, other agencies that use 
rulemaking to make policy, such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), frequently make dramatic policy turns when one 
presidential administration is replaced by another. The alternating 
position of the EPA with respect to climate change policy from the 
Bush II administration to the Obama administration to the Trump 
administration is a recent example.16  
If protecting settled expectations were the only value to be served 
by judicial review, one would generally expect a large dose of 
interpretive authority to be allocated to courts rather than agencies. 
One way this can come into play is when consistent agency action has 
given rise to settled expectations. In these circumstances, rule-of-law 
values suggest that courts should give added weight to the agency’s 
view of the law, even if the agency’s interpretation diverges from what 
 
overruling. See Thomas W. Merrill, Interpreting an Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547, 
581–83 (2018) (discussing that, in interpreting constitutional law, “the Supreme Court will give 
pride of place to its own precedents in order to cultivate an appearance of legality and reinforce 
its reputation for adherence to its own prior judgments”). The importance of adhering to 
controlling precedent was common ground among the Justices in a recent wide-ranging debate 
about whether it is more important to adhere to the ratio decidendi of a precedent or to the 
outcome reached by a precedent. Compare Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1404 (2020) 
(arguing that the ratio decidendi is what matters), with id. at 1429–30 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(maintaining that the outcome is what matters).  
 15.  See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 
37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 171 (1985) (noting that “[t]he [NLRB’s] behavior—abrupt changes in 
policy appearing to rework in wholesale major areas of Board law, often undone three or four 
years later—sows disrespect for the agency,” resulting in “courts [being] reluctant to pay little 
more than lip service to the doctrine of deference to agency policymaking . . . given the agency’s 
apparently cavalier view of its own established rules”). 
 16.  See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
70 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1114–36 (2021) (discussing several environmental policy reversals by the 
Trump EPA).  
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the court considers to be the best reading of the statute. Another way 
it can come into play is when agencies change course in a way that is 
likely to upset the expectations created by prior agency action. When 
this happens, reviewing courts should demand a persuasive 
explanation from the agency as to why frustrating expectations is 
justified in terms of competing policy objectives.17  
There is another institutional distinction between courts and 
agencies that is relevant to rule-of-law values. A central theme of the 
literature analyzing rule-of-law values is that persons are entitled to 
fair notice about the requirements of the law.18 This in turn means that 
changes in the law should ordinarily apply only to future conduct. 
Making legal change prospective allows those affected by the change 
to adjust their expectations and behavior to avoid coming into conflict 
with the law.  
The strong preference for making changes in law prospective is 
relevant to the comparison of how courts and agencies function. Courts 
nearly always engage in dispute resolution by applying the law to 
behavior that has already taken place. This means judicial decisions are 
by their nature retroactive. Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
federal courts may not resolve a dispute by entering a judgment that 
applies only prospectively.19 Agencies, in contrast, typically have a 
wider array of tools they can use to constrain behavior. Most agencies 
have the power to issue rules of various kinds, which always apply 
prospectively unless Congress has conveyed special authority to the 
agency to make them retroactive—which is rare.20 These rules include 
nonbinding statements of policy or interpretation that inform the 
public about how an agency intends to regulate in the future. So 
agencies, unlike courts, have the power to make changes in the law 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (declining to 
give weight to an agency’s regulation because it “was issued without the reasoned explanation 
that was required in light of the Department[ of Labor]’s change in position and the significant 
reliance interests involved”). 
 18.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 217 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“This 
decision is an ominous one to those who believe that men should be governed by laws that they 
may ascertain and abide by . . . .”). 
 19.  See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When this Court applies a 
rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule . . . must be given full retroactive effect in all 
cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or 
postdate our announcement of the rule.” (emphasis added)). 
 20.  See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“[A] statutory grant 
of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the 
power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express 
terms.”). 
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prospective, which is the way changes should be made if protecting 
settled expectations is important because of reliance interests.  
In short, reviewing courts should give added weight to agency 
interpretations that conform to settled expectations and should 
subtract weight—or demand an explanation—for interpretations that 
frustrate settled expectations. They should also, if possible, encourage 
agencies to make changes in the law prospective. 
B. Constitutional Values 
As administrative governance grows, it inevitably comes into 
conflict with values that have been identified as constitutional. Here, 
the division of authority between courts and agencies is settled. By 
convention, the courts, most notably the Supreme Court, have final 
authority to determine constitutional meaning, and other 
governmental actors are duty-bound to accept the decisions issued by 
the courts in the name of the Constitution.21  
In considering the role of constitutional values, individual 
constitutional rights and federalism principles are obviously important, 
and courts are expected to enforce these limits on the scope of agency 
authority. Separation of powers principles are even more pervasively 
relevant in considering judicial review of questions of law. Here, the 
crux is preserving the constitutional role of Congress in our system of 
government. The Constitution has always been understood to establish 
the principle of legislative supremacy. What this means is that duly 
enacted legislation is a higher form of legal authority than any 
regulation or order issued by an administrative agency or any executive 
order issued by the president. All agree that if there is a direct and 
unambiguous conflict between what a statute says and either what an 
agency does by regulation or order or what the president does by 
executive order, the statute prevails. There is nevertheless a latent 
ambiguity about the meaning of legislative supremacy. There are three 
possible ways of unpacking what it means that Congress’s legislative 
power is supreme relative to regulations and orders issued by 
administrative agencies or executive orders issued by the president.22 
 
 21.  See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (noting the longstanding historical debate between 
the “departmentalist” and “judicial supremacy” positions and endorsing the emerging consensus 
in favor of the judicial supremacy conception as promoting a “settlement function”). 
 22.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2117–18 (2004) (detailing the three conceptions based on 
different readings of the Constitution). 
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One possibility is that legislative supremacy means the 
Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to set policy in a 
legally binding fashion. This is the understanding associated with the 
so-called nondelegation doctrine. The Constitution gives “[a]ll 
legislative [p]owers” to Congress23 and, therefore, under this 
conception of supremacy, the sharing of such power is impermissible. 
Agencies may be charged with enforcing or implementing the law as 
established by Congress, but they cannot be given the power to make 
legally binding policy. 
A second possibility is that the Constitution gives Congress the 
exclusive power, if it does not set policy itself, to delegate to another 
institution, such as an agency, the power to set policy in a legally 
binding fashion. This is the anti-inherency understanding. Given the 
allocation of all legislative power to Congress, administrative 
agencies—and for that matter the president and the courts—have no 
inherent authority to “make law” that binds the public. They must 
derive their authority to set policy from some form of enacted law—
either a specific provision of the Constitution or, more typically, a 
statute enacted by Congress.  
The third possibility is that the Constitution gives Congress the last 
word in determining legally binding policy. Under this understanding, 
Congress always has the power to override legally binding policy 
established by the president or an agency. But if Congress is silent, 
executive and judicial entities have the authority to make legally 
binding policy in areas where the federal government as a whole is 
competent to act. In other words, administrative agencies and the 
president have inherent authority to act in default of Congress, but 
must conform to any limitations adopted by Congress that limit this 
discretion.24 
Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the anti-
inherency interpretation has the strongest claim to being the dominant 
conception of legislative supremacy today. There are, to be sure, 
relatively few explicit statements of this understanding from the 
Supreme Court in cases involving a direct clash between Congress and 
the president. The most famous is Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in 
 
 23.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 24.  Lest the “last word” conception be regarded as fanciful, it should be noted that this is 
the understanding that has sometimes been adopted by the Supreme Court in authorizing courts 
to employ federal common law to resolve particular disputes that implicate “federal interests.” 
For further discussion, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 
329–31 (1992). 
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case),25 
which invalidated President Harry Truman’s effort to nationalize steel 
mills threatened by a labor shutdown in the midst of the Korean War.26 
Justice Black said flatly that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue 
the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself.”27 But the precedential value of this statement was 
compromised by various concurring opinions, which left the door open 
to recognizing some inherent presidential power to act in certain 
circumstances.28 Where administrative agencies are concerned and the 
question is limited to domestic policy, there are many more statements 
from the Supreme Court adopting the anti-inherency position.29  
More impressive than occasional statements by the Court, 
however, is the consistent practice of both the executive branch and 
the judiciary over time. Presidents have consistently acknowledged 
that they have no authority to create new departments or agencies 
without the authorization of Congress. Agencies have uniformly 
recognized the need to ground their authority to act in some statutory 
authority conferred on them by Congress. And courts have repeatedly 
exercised their power of judicial review to invalidate agency action 
perceived as going beyond what Congress has authorized, or as 
transgressing some limitation imposed by statute. Judging by settled 
expectations based on actual practice, the anti-inherency position has 
evolved to become the dominant understanding of the meaning of 
legislative supremacy.30 
 
 25.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 26.  Id. at 587.  
 27.  Id. at 585.  
 28.  The most famous being the concurrence of Justice Robert Jackson, who posited a “zone 
of twilight” where the president asserts his own authority without Congress having spoken on the 
issue. Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 29.  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989) (“[R]ulemaking power 
originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive function only when delegated by 
the Legislature to the Executive Branch.”); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 
(1988) (“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative 
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 
476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress 
confers power upon it.”); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (“The legislative 
power of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority 
by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the 
Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes.”).  
 30.  See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 61 (1993) (concluding, based on a wide-ranging review of the relevant history, that 
“[o]ur tradition is that no official—from the President down—can invade private rights unless 
authorized by legislation”). 
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The anti-inherency interpretation of legislative supremacy, 
assuming it is the established understanding, has important 
implications for judicial review of agency interpretations of law. Under 
this view, administrative agencies have no authority to act unless and 
until they have been delegated such authority by Congress, and their 
authority to act is limited to whatever powers Congress has in fact 
granted.31 Congress, in other words, is uniquely endowed with the 
power to decide who decides.32 This has important implications for 
judicial review. The anti-inherency postulate is a critical axiom in our 
evolved understanding of the separation of powers. Courts, as 
guardians of the Constitution, should therefore enforce the limitations 
Congress has placed on the authority of agencies in order to preserve 
the principle that Congress has the exclusive prerogative to establish 
agencies and delineate their powers and limits.  
The anti-inherency principle, as a postulate of constitutional law, 
is largely invisible to modern lawyers and judges. This is because it has 
been subsumed in the nearly universal practice of providing for a right 
of judicial review when challenging the legality of agency action. From 
roughly the 1920s to the present, the established device for monitoring 
agency compliance with the scope of its delegated authority has been 
judicial review of final agency action. When Congress creates a federal 
agency and gives it delegated powers, Congress also provides for 
judicial review of the agency’s decisions on behalf of persons aggrieved 
by final agency action. If an aggrieved person claims that the agency 
exceeded the scope of its delegated power, the reviewing court will 
interpret the scope of the agency’s delegated power, and if it agrees 
that the agency has exceeded its authority, it sets aside the agency 
action as unlawful.33 Except in unusual cases, the reviewing court will 
make no reference to the separation of powers premise underlying this 
mode of review—the need to protect the superior power of Congress 
 
 31.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000) 
(“Rather than invalidating federal legislation as excessively open-ended, courts hold that federal 
administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities unless and until Congress has 
expressly authorized them to do so.”). 
 32.  Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 
454 & n.12 (2010). 
 33.  This understanding was expressly codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, 
adopted in 1946. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (reviewing court is to decide all questions of law); id. 
§ 706(2)(C) (reviewing court shall set aside agency action “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”). 
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to create an agency and delimit the scope of its delegated powers.34 
There has been no need to elevate the issue to the level of 
constitutional principle because it has been sufficient to invalidate the 
agency action as contrary to the statute creating its delegated powers. 
The constitutional principle has remained submerged because 
Congress has routinely provided for judicial review, implicitly 
recognizing that such review is the only realistic device available to it 
for assuring that its intentions about the scope of power it has 
delegated to an agency will be enforced.35  
Thus, although the principle of legislative supremacy is ultimately 
grounded in separation of powers principles, this does not mean that 
agency action that exceeds the scope of its delegated authority should 
be held unconstitutional. It is almost never necessary to reach such a 
judgment.36 What is necessary—and required by the anti-inherency 
principle—is that courts engage in careful review to determine that 
agencies (and, as appropriate, the president) have stayed within the 
boundaries of their authority as established by duly enacted legislation. 
The practice of careful review by courts in this context is required by 
the Constitution, even if every exercise of authority by an agency that 
is ultra vires need not be characterized as unconstitutional.37 It is not 
 
 34.  One such unusual case was Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
The Court invalidated an EPA regulation that interpreted a statutory provision specifying “250 
tons” of air pollutant to mean “100,000 tons” in the context of emissions of carbon dioxide. Id. at 
325. The Court observed that allowing such an interpretation to stand would “deal a severe blow 
to the Constitution’s separation of powers.” Id. at 327. 
 35.  The APA recognized that Congress could explicitly or implicitly make agency action 
unreviewable. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). But Congress has rarely done so where important private rights 
are at stake, and the Court has interpreted the APA as creating a broad presumption in favor of 
judicial review. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567–69 (2019) (holding 
that the secretary of commerce’s broad authority under the Census Act does not preclude judicial 
review under the APA); Abbott Labs. v. Gardiner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (holding that the 
APA “embodies the basic presumption of judicial review”).  
 36.  See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994) (“Our cases do not support the 
proposition that every action by the President, or by another executive official, in excess of his 
statutory authority is ipso facto in violation of the Constitution.”).  
 37.  This proposition seems to suggest that some form of judicial review assuring that 
agencies act within the scope of their authority is required by the Constitution. For some of the 
difficulties in sustaining such an argument, see Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Judicial 
Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 79–85 (2010). As long as Congress is still interested in 
preserving its constitutional prerogative to decide who decides, one can assume Congress will 
continue to provide for judicial review of agency action in order to hold the executive in check. If 
Congress decides to acquiesce in allowing the executive branch to become the primary source of 
policy initiatives, Congress may lose interest in assuring that judicial review is available.  
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necessary to do so, given that every exercise of authority that is ultra 
vires is for that reason unlawful.  
C. Accountability Values  
So far, the discussion has pointed toward the importance of courts 
exercising autonomous judgment in reviewing agency interpretations 
of law. A third set of values—the importance of having discretionary 
policy decisions made by politically accountable institutions—turns the 
balance decisively in favor of agencies.  
How should courts proceed when the question of interpretation 
falls comfortably within the boundaries of the agency’s discretionary 
authority and does not implicate the importance of settled legal 
expectations? We can reframe the question as follows: As between the 
agency and the reviewing court, which institution has a comparative 
advantage in resolving matters of discretionary interpretive choice?  
When rule-of-law values and constitutional values are excluded, it 
becomes clear that the agency should resolve matters of discretionary 
interpretive choice. Such choices commonly present trade-offs 
between competing values. Do we want safer drugs or faster access to 
medical innovations? Less pollution or more economic growth? Fewer 
accidents or more affordable products? Resolving these trade-offs 
entails decisions that are essentially political. Many would argue that 
such decisions should be made by the people’s elected 
representatives.38 This is seemingly what the Constitution 
contemplates, given that the document says that all legislative powers 
are given to Congress. And indeed, Congress often resolves them by 
enacting statutes that adopt highly precise answers to questions of 
public policy.39 
But Congress and the president—who participates in the 
legislative process in proposing legislation and exercising the veto—are 
severely constrained in their capacities to resolve even a fraction of the 
matters of discretionary interpretive choice that arise. This is especially 
true in the modern world, with its rapid rate of technological, 
 
 38.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 130–36 (1980) (arguing that it is “undemocratic” for the legislature to delegate hard 
issues to “some executive-branch bureaucrat, or perhaps some independent regulatory 
commission,” in order to avoid “the inevitable political heat”). 
 39.  Modern legislation increasingly takes the form of extremely lengthy enactments that 
contain a combination of highly specific provisions intermixed with general or ambiguous 
directives. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2016) (providing illustrations). 
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economic, and social change.40 Therefore, out of necessity, Congress 
and the president, both acting through the legislative process, have 
created administrative agencies to address these issues. Of course, as 
previously discussed, Congress also sets limits on the authority of these 
agencies, and provides for judicial review to assure that they are 
respected.  
Resolving matters of discretionary interpretive choice in a way 
that is responsive to the collective wishes of the people presents a kind 
of second-best choice in most circumstances: Should such issues be 
decided by agencies or courts? Neither institution is directly 
accountable to the people. Unlike the members of Congress and the 
president, the heads of agencies and federal judges do not stand for 
periodic election. Both the heads of agencies and judges are nominated 
by the president and subject to confirmation by the Senate, which gives 
each a measure of indirect accountability. But whereas agency heads 
turn over fairly frequently—usually at the end of each four-year 
presidential term at minimum41—judges can potentially serve for life. 
So, agency heads are more likely to have received the assent of the 
current elected representatives of the people—the president and the 
Senate—as compared to judges, many of whom ascended to the bench 
decades ago. 
Political scientists also point out that agencies are subject to a 
number of constraints that make them more accountable to elected 
politicians than judges.42 Agencies depend on Congress for their 
appropriations, which means the heads of agencies must attend closely 
to the wishes of appropriations committees.43 High-level agency 
personnel also appear periodically before congressional oversight 
committees, which can expose embarrassing missteps and extract 
commitments about future action.44 Under current practice, agency 
 
 40.  See generally WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL 
ACCELERATION OF TIME (2004) (examining the effect that the fast pace of modern society has 
on liberal democracies).  
 41.  See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE 
DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 69 (1995) (noting that the average tenure of a political 
appointee in the executive branch is roughly two years). 
 42.  See, e.g., Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: 
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in 
a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 120, 163 (1996).  
 43.  For a general discussion of sources of congressional control, see Jack M. Beermann, 
Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 64, 68 (2006) (concluding that 
“Congress is deeply involved in the day to day administration of the law”).  
 44.  Hammond & Knott, supra note 42, at 123–27.  
MERRILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:10 PM 
2021] RE-READING CHEVRON 1167 
budget requests are also screened by the Office of Management and 
Budget (“OMB”), a White House agency, which means the heads of 
agencies must attend to the wishes of the president.45 And political 
appointees of agencies are subject to removal from office by the 
president, either at will or indirectly through various forms of pressure. 
Lastly, again as a matter of current practice, agency rules that exceed a 
certain minimum (for example, $100 million in annual effect on the 
economy) are subject to review by another office of the OMB, the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which again gives the 
White House a measure of control over agency policy choices.46 There 
is nothing comparable in terms of oversight of federal judges.  
In short, if interpretations involving discretionary policy choice 
should be made by the more accountable decisionmaker, agencies win 
over courts hands down.47  
Focusing on accountability does not disregard a second reason to 
prefer agencies over courts in resolving open discretionary issues—
namely, the greater expertise of agencies in matters of public policy. 
Recognizing that agencies are inevitably political does not mean that 
agency expertise will be ignored. The early proponents of 
administrative government—the Progressives and their intellectual 
heirs—characterized administrative agencies as scientific, neutral, 
apolitical entities, and juxtaposed them with crude actors like big-city 
political machines.48 In other words, expertise was seen as incompatible 
with accountability. But time has revealed this to be a false dichotomy. 
 
 45.  See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 
YALE L.J. 2182, 2203–04 (2016) (noting how the OMB’s ability to control agencies’ spending 
influences the agencies’ policy decisions).  
 46.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths 
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013) (discussing the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs). For sources of presidential control over agencies, see generally Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). Then-Professor Kagan concluded 
that “the most important [extrajudicial] development in the last two decades in administrative 
process, and a development that also has important implications for administrative 
substance[,] . . . is the presidentialization of administration—the emergence of enhanced methods 
of presidential control over the regulatory state.” Id. at 2383.  
 47.  See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (“Strangely enough it may make sense to imagine 
the delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the responsiveness 
of government to the desires of the electorate.”). 
 48.  For the social background, values, and attitudes of the Progressives, see generally 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 131–73 (1955). For a 
portrait of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., a leading advocate of regulatory reform during this era, 
see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 1–57 (1984). 
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Public opinion will demand that certain decisions be made by those 
with the requisite skill and experience to make them correctly—or at 
least those more likely than political appointees or courts to make them 
correctly. Consider decisions like how to respond to a pandemic, how 
to determine whether nuclear reactors have been safely designed and 
operated, or how to fix the money supply to provide the proper balance 
between inflation and employment. The public generally does not want 
these sorts of decisions made by White House operatives or by 
judges—they want someone with specific expertise. And because of 
this, politicians will also prefer that these decisions be made by 
agencies with the requisite degree of relevant expertise. Therefore, in 
structuring judicial review to assure that discretionary interpretive 
choices are made by politically accountable agencies, the courts will 
indirectly assure that decisions that should be made by experts are 
made with significant input from experts.  
Readers familiar with the literature on judicial review will 
perceive a potentially serious problem in differentiating between 
questions that fall outside the boundaries of agency authority and those 
that fall inside those boundaries. In a fateful decision, Justice Antonin 
Scalia attacked the concept of “agency jurisdiction” as a “mirage,” an 
“empty distraction,” and a “bogeyman.”49 This was rhetorical overkill, 
as revealed by the fact that he was able to identify a number of 
Supreme Court decisions that implicated the scope of agency 
jurisdiction, demonstrating that the distinction is not meaningless.50 He 
also conceded that courts have long differentiated between 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions in determining their own 
authority, suggesting that the distinction is conceptually meaningful.51 
In practice, the boundaries of agency authority will often be easier 
to discern than it may seem from considering the matter in the abstract. 
Once again, settled expectations are highly relevant. The scope of 
agency authority is rarely a matter of reading the words of a statute in 
a vacuum. When an agency is first created, the principal officers of the 
agency will nearly always have a clear appreciation of the functions that 
Congress and the president expect the agency will perform. The initial 
actions of the agency will reflect this shared understanding. If Congress 
and the president do not react negatively, this will provide a further 
signal to agency heads that they have understood their charge 
 
 49.  City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297, 300, 304 (2013). 
 50.  Id. at 300–04. 
 51.  See id. at 297.  
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correctly. Over time, the functions of the agency may evolve, in 
response to problems not foreseen when the initial legislation was 
enacted. The agency may amend its understanding of its mandate in 
light of these new problems. Again, if Congress and the president 
acquiesce, this would provide a signal of approval. All along, the 
agency’s actions may result in periodic review by the courts, and if the 
courts accept the agency’s understanding of its authority, this will 
provide further confirmation that the agency has correctly understood 
the scope of its authority. The essential point is that, at any given time, 
the scope of the agency’s authority will be governed not just by the 
words of the statute, but by settled expectations, which evolve in an 
incremental fashion. Deviations from these expectations are usually 
easy to spot.52 
In any event, even assuming that Justice Scalia was right that the 
line between the scope of agency authority and the exercise of 
authority will sometimes be disputable, it does not follow that every 
difficult question about the scope of authority should be left up to the 
agency to decide. This would mean largely giving up on judicial 
enforcement of constitutional values like legislative supremacy. The 
better position is that any provision of enacted law that limits the 
discretion of an agency is a “boundary,” and hence the interpretation 
of such a constraint must be resolved by the courts. This does not mean 
courts should ignore an agency’s interpretation of the scope of its 
authority. Courts should give respectful consideration to the agency’s 
view; and if that view is consistent with settled expectations, it deserves 
additional weight. The risk of error in these circumstances is reduced 
by the use of such an intermediate standard of review, as opposed to 
de novo review. And, of course, erroneous judicial decisions about the 
scope of agency authority can always be corrected by Congress. 
D. Process Values 
A final value to be considered is whether judicial review can be 
structured in such a way as to improve the quality of agency statutory 
interpretations. Once again, we are considering matters of 
discretionary interpretive choice. If an agency is not frustrating settled 
expectations and is acting within the boundaries of its delegated 
 
 52.  See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143–59 (2000) 
(detailing a long history of agency disclaimers of authority and congressional responses to show 
that a general understanding had developed that the FDA had no authority to regulate tobacco 
products). 
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authority, courts should generally accept an agency’s interpretation of 
the statute it enforces. But perhaps judicial review can be formulated 
so as to increase the odds that agencies will make good statutory 
interpretation decisions. 
For much of the run-up to Chevron, courts differentiated between 
“good” and “not so good” agency interpretations by asking whether 
the agency interpretation was “reasonable.”53 Very little, if any, 
progress has been made by courts in refining what this means, either 
before or after Chevron. Particularly, it has never been clear whether 
“reasonable” means reasonable as judged by the traditional tools of 
interpretation used by courts, reasonable in terms of the policy result 
that the agency seeks to advance by its interpretation, or reasonable in 
terms of the process the agency followed in reaching its interpretation.  
The first meaning—reasonable as a matter of legal interpretation 
adopting judicial standards of interpretation—seems to require that 
the agency follow the same decisional process that the courts follow. 
This requires a duplication of effort by the agency and the court, which 
makes little sense from the perspective of trying to identify the 
comparative advantage of each institution. In theory, one can imagine 
a regime in which reviewing courts exercise great self-restraint by 
cabining their exercise of interpretation to a narrow, “clause-bound” 
examination of statutory text, and then ask whether the agency 
interpretation is “reasonable” in light of a broader range of variables 
like statutory structure, purpose, and legislative history. In the 
comparatively small number of cases that invalidate agency 
interpretations under Step Two of the Chevron doctrine, a number of 
appeals courts have interpreted “reasonable” in this fashion.54 In the 
larger scheme of things, this is unrealistic. Once courts are told to 
engage in de novo review of the question of interpretation, and to do 
so armed with all the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, it is 
inevitable that the judicial inquiry will expand into a full-scale judicial 
exposition of the court’s understanding of the statute’s best meaning. 
Once this happens, asking whether the agency interpretation is 
“reasonable” becomes a foregone conclusion in nearly all cases—as a 
matter of psychology, if not logic.55 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not 
 
 53.  See, e.g., Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 
380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).  
 54.  Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1441, 1451–54 (2018). 
 55.  As then-Judge Stephen Breyer remarked in an early critique of the Chevron doctrine: 
“It is difficult, after having examined a legal question in depth with the object of deciding it 
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hold an agency interpretation “unreasonable” under Step Two of the 
Chevron doctrine until 1999, and has done so on only three occasions 
overall.56 
The second meaning—reasonable as a matter of policy—seems to 
invite courts to substitute their judgment for the agency’s as to the 
wisdom of the policy being pursued. This is inconsistent with the fact 
that Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make policy 
judgments, not the courts.  
The third possibility—reasonable as a matter of the process 
followed in reaching the interpretation—seems to hold the most 
promise for constructive judicial intervention designed to encourage 
better agency interpretations without constraining the agency’s 
exercise of delegated authority. Fortunately, courts have developed a 
model for reviewing the process agencies follow in the context of 
judicial review of agency policy choices adopted through rulemaking. 
Ever since the 1970s, reviewing courts have sought to discipline agency 
exercises of policymaking in this context by imposing a norm of 
reasoned decisionmaking as a condition of upholding agency policies.57 
This is sometimes called “hard look” review, meaning the reviewing 
court must assure that the agency has taken a hard look at its various 
policy options before it acts. Assuming that questions of discretionary 
interpretive choice are at least analogous to policymaking, arguably the 
same or similar norm of reasoned decisionmaking should be required 
by courts as a condition of accepting an agency’s interpretation. A 
better name for this form of judicial review is “process review,” in 
 
correctly, to believe both that the agency’s interpretation is legally wrong, and that its 
interpretation is reasonable.” Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986). 
 56.  Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 759–60 (2015); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 
302, 325–28 (2014); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999). All three decisions, 
not coincidentally, were authored by Justice Scalia, who concluded late in his judicial career that 
the only relevant question to ask is whether an agency interpretation is “reasonable.” See United 
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).  
 57.  For early examples, see, for example, Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 
841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). This norm of reasoned decisionmaking is generally regarded as having been endorsed in 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
48–51 (1983) (holding that plausible alternatives to an agency’s proposed course of action must 
be addressed and adequate reasons given for their rejection). 
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order to avoid confusing it with the ambiguous requirement of 
“reasonableness.”58 
The norm of process review, as applied to statutory interpretation, 
is relatively easy to state in the abstract. The norm requires that the 
agency: (1) consider plausible alternatives and significant objections to 
its proposed interpretation of the statute; (2) explain why its 
interpretation falls within the scope of its delegated authority and 
summarize the considerations of policy that support its choice; and (3) 
provide an explanation for either accepting or rejecting plausible 
alternatives or significant objections to its authority or its preferred 
interpretation before finally adopting it.59  
The argument for why process review might increase the odds of 
agencies making better interpretations is straightforward. If conducted 
in good faith, process review should be compatible with a variety of 
outcomes and thus does not carry the implication that the reviewing 
court is a kind of censor with the power to veto policies with which it 
disagrees. Under the process-review norm, agencies are likely to 
engage in more careful deliberation about the relevant issues presented 
by any proposed interpretation before it is adopted. The agency may 
come to recognize that the proposed interpretation interferes too much 
with existing reliance interests or is inconsistent with aspects of its 
statutory mandate. Or it may conclude that the proposed 
interpretation is overly broad and should be cut back, or is 
underinclusive and should be expanded. The need to consider 
objections and provide an explanation for accepting or rejecting them 
 
 58.  Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure, and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for 
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 316, 323–31, 343 (1996). 
 59.  The elements of process review as described here have been developed most fully in the 
context of notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) and have been shaped by 
the requirements of that section of the APA. Nevertheless, the modern understanding of process 
review in the rulemaking process is difficult to square with the language of § 553. See Am. Radio 
Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Courts have incrementally expanded 
those APA procedural requirements well beyond what the text [of § 553] provides.”). They are 
commonly justified as a gloss on what is required by the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (noting that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard requires an agency to articulate the rationale behind their decisions). That standard, in 
turn, applies to all forms of reviewable agency action. Therefore, it is not much of a stretch to 
regard the elements of process review, as described here, as being required before a court will 
accept an agency interpretation of law adopted within the agency’s delegated space to interpret. 
For decisions applying elements of process review to agency interpretations of law, see Encino 
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016), and Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 
(2009). 
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will create the conditions for making these self-corrections, without 
any direct intrusion by the reviewing court. The reviewing court need 
only assure that the required decisional process has been followed; it 
need not usurp the prerogative of the agency as the proper institution 
to make discretionary interpretational choices.  
Counterarguments against adopting process review are that it 
would increase the costs of agency decisionmaking—called the 
“ossification” problem in the context of rulemaking—and would 
increase opportunities for judicial meddling in policy decisions 
properly left to agency resolutions.60 
As to cost, extending process review to agency statutory 
interpretations would arguably be less burdensome than it is in the 
context of pure policy choices made through rulemaking. Generally 
speaking, empirical data or studies will not be that relevant to 
questions of statutory interpretation, and objections and explanatory 
responses to objections will focus on legal issues rather than complex 
empirical claims and predictions. Also, to the extent the process-review 
norm is already applicable to the policy aspect of an agency initiative, 
extending it to a legal interpretation would add only marginally to the 
burden on the agency.  
As to judicial meddling, enforcing the process review norm would 
undoubtedly create further opportunities for willful judicial behavior. 
Some courts would trim their views about whether the agency has 
complied with the norm in order to affirm an interpretation they like 
or vacate one they dislike. The concern about the potential for willful 
judicial behavior is present under virtually any conception of how 
judicial review should operate. The relevant question is whether 
adopting a norm of process review would increase the incidence of 
willful behavior to an unacceptable degree relative to the benefits that 
might be obtained from better agency interpretations. The answer is 
obviously speculative. But it is plausible that requiring the agency to 
consider material alternatives and objections, and give a cogent 
explanation in response, would result, over the large run of cases, in 
improved agency interpretations. Reasonable minds can differ about 
 
 60.  For concerns about ossification in the context of rulemaking, see generally, for example, 
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 59 (1995). For evidence that judges use process review to advance their own policy 
preferences, see generally, for example, Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, 
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). 
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whether extending process review to questions of statutory 
interpretation would produce benefits that exceed its costs.  
Regardless of how one comes out on that question, a secondary 
benefit of extending process review to questions of statutory 
interpretation returns to the earlier point about the desirability of 
making changes in the law prospective. If acceptance of agency 
interpretations turns on compliance with the process review norm, as 
described, the natural way to comply would be to advance the 
interpretation through substantive or interpretive rulemaking or a 
declaratory order.61 Since these forms of administrative action are 
nearly always prospective, the interpretation would be prospective as 
well. 
All of which suggests that the regime of judicial review should 
include, as one of its elements, conditioning judicial acceptance of an 
agency interpretation in a matter of discretionary interpretive choice 
on the agency’s compliance with the process review norm. This 
condition would create an incentive for agencies to observe the norm 
and to resolve statutory interpretation questions prospectively. 
E. The Four Values and the Chevron Doctrine  
What this Article calls “the Chevron doctrine” refers to a 
paragraph in Part II of Justice John Paul Stevens’s opinion in Chevron, 
which says that judicial review of agency legal interpretations always 
entails two steps.62 The D.C. Circuit quickly treated this paragraph as 
announcing a new standard of review, and that understanding 
eventually appeared in various opinions by the Supreme Court, largely 
due to the persistent advocacy of Justice Scalia.63 In its typical 
formulation, the Chevron doctrine is a compound of two standards. 
Step One asks whether the statute supplies a “clear” or “unambiguous” 
answer to the precise question at issue. If yes, that answer must be 
enforced by the reviewing court. If no, then the court asks, at Step Two, 
 
 61.  For example, the agency interpretation in City of Arlington v. FCC was issued as a 
declaratory order, which is a form of adjudication, but the FCC nevertheless solicited public 
comment on its proposed interpretation before it entered the order, thereby complying with the 
process-review norm. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 569 
U.S. 290 (2013). 
 62.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 63.  For the origins of the Chevron doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, see generally Gary Lawson 
& Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2013), and Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an 
Accidental Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253 (2014) [hereinafter Merrill, Story of Chevron]. 
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whether the agency interpretation is a “reasonable” or a “permissible” 
answer to the question. If yes, then the court must accept the agency 
interpretation. As formulated, the Chevron doctrine does a poor job of 
advancing each of the four values highlighted here. 
With respect to rule-of-law values, understood to mean promoting 
stability of legal expectations, the problem with the two-step formula 
is that it provides no obvious way to consider or enforce such values 
unless they are reflected in an unambiguous text enacted by Congress. 
Step One, which directs the court to engage in de novo review to 
determine whether the statute has a clear meaning, provides no 
occasion to consider whether the agency interpretation otherwise 
frustrates settled expectations. Step Two, which asks if the agency 
interpretation is reasonable, could conceivably be used to ask if the 
agency interpretation reinforces or upsets settled expectations. But the 
dominant understanding of Step Two has been to ask if the agency 
interpretation is reasonable in light of judicial interpretational norms.64 
As a result, assessing the agency interpretation against settled 
expectations effectively drops out under the Chevron formula. The 
relevance of a settled agency interpretation nevertheless persists in the 
case law, because this is an important value long recognized by courts. 
But its persistence occurs largely in the form of a random, ad hoc 
consideration extraneous to the Chevron doctrine.65 
With respect to constitutional values, most prominently the 
separation of powers principle of legislative supremacy, Step One of 
the Chevron doctrine correctly charges reviewing courts with enforcing 
clear or unambiguous congressional directives. But the scope of an 
agency’s delegated authority is often implicit in a series of legislative 
enactments over time or becomes apparent only when considered in 
light of established conventions about the role of different agencies or 
the functions of the federal government as opposed to state and local 
governments. These contextual understandings are ones that courts are 
particularly well-suited to discern, but it is misleading to say they can 
always be found in a “clear” or “unambiguous” text. Taken literally, 
the Chevron doctrine seems to say that if Congress fails to spell out the 
scope of an agency’s authority in unambiguous language, the agency 
can exploit any gap, silence, or ambiguity in its organic act to expand 
 
 64.  Barnett & Walker, supra note 54, at 1451–54. 
 65.  See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823 (2015) (collecting decisions referring to the longevity of agency 
interpretations after Chevron). 
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or contract the scope of its authority in any way that passes muster as 
a permissible interpretation. The principle of legislative supremacy 
would inevitably devolve from the anti-inherency understanding to the 
last-word conception. 
One might think that, at the very least, the Chevron doctrine 
would advance the idea that when a question of interpretation is really 
a matter of discretionary policy choice, the agency interpretation 
should prevail. Justice Stevens made plain in the concluding 
paragraphs of his opinion that this was his understanding.66 The 
Chevron doctrine, however, is a compound of two highly indeterminate 
standards. How clear is clear? What exactly does it mean for an agency 
interpretation to be reasonable? Given these indeterminacies, the 
Chevron doctrine, in practice, is more realistically described as a 
license for judicial willfulness. If a court dislikes an agency 
interpretation that entails a policy choice, it can declare that the statute 
“clearly” requires a different choice, or, more rarely, can declare that 
the agency’s interpretation is “unreasonable.” Worse, because the two-
step formula is highly streamlined compared to the eclectic doctrine 
and elaborate investigations of legislative history that preceded it, the 
Chevron doctrine actually reduces the cost of judicial willfulness, 
inevitably increasing its incidence. 
In terms of providing incentives for agencies to make better 
interpretations, the Chevron doctrine also comes up short. The key 
here is the ambiguity about what it means for an agency interpretation 
to be reasonable. The Supreme Court could have interpreted this to 
mean reasonable as a matter of the decisional process followed by the 
agency, but it has not consistently done so. In other contexts, the Court 
seems comfortable with the understanding that the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) requires reasoned decisionmaking when an 
agency makes a pure policy decision, whether it be through 
rulemaking, adjudication, or other informal agency action.67 But it has 
failed to condition acceptance of agency interpretations of statutes on 
 
 66.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–66. 
 67.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910–
15 (2020) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to the rescission of a policy statement 
and faulting the agency for failing to consider alternatives and not addressing reliance interests); 
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019) (applying the arbitrary and capricious 
standard to an internal memorandum written by the secretary of commerce and holding that it 
advanced an explanation “incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s priorities 
and decisionmaking process”); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) 
(ruling that arbitrary and capricious review requires an explanation for a change in agency policy 
adopted in an FCC adjudication). 
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agency compliance with such a process. In particular, the Court has 
applied the Chevron doctrine to interpretations announced in 
adjudications when there has been no advance notice or opportunity 
to comment on the interpretation before it is rendered.68  
In short, the Chevron doctrine, as commonly understood by lower 
courts and administrative law professors, fails to sufficiently advance 
the four values of judicial review briefly adumbrated here. In order to 
determine whether the Court can reformulate that doctrine to improve 
on this score, the place to start is by re-reading the Chevron decision 
itself. 
II.  THE CHEVRON OPINION: PARTS III–VII 
The legal issue presented in Chevron was whether the EPA had 
correctly interpreted the term “stationary source,” for purposes of the 
nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act, to mean an entire plant 
as opposed to a single apparatus like a smokestack.69 The term 
stationary source first appeared in the 1970 version of the Act under 
another program and included a definition that did not resolve whether 
it referred to the entire plant or any apparatus in the plant.70 This 
definition was not cross-referenced in the nonattainment program, 
adopted in 1977.71 The D.C. Circuit rendered three decisions about the 
meaning of “stationary source” under different Clean Air Act 
programs and concluded that whether the term referred to the entire 
plant or each apparatus depended on whether the purpose of the 
provision was to improve or simply maintain existing air quality.72 
Chevron is a long opinion, the body of it taking up twenty-seven 
pages in the U.S. Reports, including forty-one footnotes.73 It is not 
surprising that administrative law and legislation casebooks offer only 
a highly abridged version of the opinion. In fact, most renditions of the 
 
 68.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.12 (citing eight cases applying the 
Chevron doctrine to an interpretation rendered in a formal adjudication); id. at 231 & n.13 (citing 
Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–
57 (1995) as a case applying the Chevron doctrine to an informal adjudication in the form of a 
letter of the comptroller of the currency granting the request of a national bank to act as an agent 
selling annuities). 
 69.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
 70.  Id. at 846. 
 71.  Id. at 859–60.  
 72.  For further background about the decision, see Merrill, Story of Chevron, supra note 63, 
at 260–66. 
 73.  Chevron, 468 U.S. at 837–66. 
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decision reproduce the opening paragraphs of Part II and three 
paragraphs near the end of Part VII (under the subheading “Policy”), 
and they either summarize or offer extremely compressed versions of 
everything in between.74 This is understandable, but unfortunate. If the 
entire opinion is read from beginning to end, one discovers an 
especially thorough, but generally conventional, exercise in judicial 
review. Perhaps more surprisingly, the opinion can stand as the very 
model of a decision that reflects the four values set forth in Part I as 
critical in a regime of judicial review.  
A. Rule-of-Law Values 
Consider first, rule-of-law values. Congress can create settled 
expectations when it legislates. The Chevron opinion reveals that 
Justice Stevens looked hard for, and did not find, any settled 
expectations created by Congress about the meaning of “stationary 
source.” He meticulously examined the text of both the original Clean 
Air Act provision dealing with stationary sources and the two later 
programs dealing with them.75 He probed the legislative history, 
looking for any evidence that the relevant committees or floor sponsors 
of the 1977 amendments harbored any thoughts about the meaning of 
“source.”76 He found no evidence of any legislative direction on this 
point in either the text or the legislative history. Without such 
legislative direction, the action of Congress itself could not have given 
rise to legitimate expectations about the law on the part of either the 
subjects or the beneficiaries of new source regulation by the EPA. 
Chevron is often cited as a break with previous tradition regarding 
the relevance of expectations created by agency action.77 The opinion 
makes no mention of the established canons of interpretation giving 
extra weight to agency interpretations that are contemporaneous with 
the enactment of the statute or are longstanding and consistently 
maintained by the agency.78 And in a section of the opinion addressing 
 
 74.  E.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, PETER M. SHANE, M. ELIZABETH 
MAGILL, MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR & NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 1002–07 (7th ed. 2014). 
 75.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845–52, 859–62.  
 76.  Id. at 862–64.  
 77.  E.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (stating that after Chevron “there is no longer any justification for giving 
‘special’ deference to ‘long-standing and consistent’ agency interpretations of law”). 
 78.  Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE 
L.J. 908, 997–99 (2017). 
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the respondents’ argument that the EPA was entitled to no deference 
because it had changed its position about the meaning of stationary 
source, Justice Stevens rejected this as a ground for overturning the 
agency decision. As he wrote in a frequently quoted passage: “An 
initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the 
contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider 
varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing 
basis.”79  
A fair reading of the opinion’s larger discussion of this point, 
however, suggests that Justice Stevens rejected the relevance of the 
agency’s change in position because no settled expectation about the 
definition of source had been established by the agency. To the contrary, 
Justice Stevens made clear that the agency had consistently preferred 
a “flexible” definition of “source.”80 It did a flip-flop between 1979 and 
1980, but this was caused not by its own inconstancy, but by the 
insistence of the D.C. Circuit that the statute had to be read “inflexibly 
to command a plantwide definition for programs designed to maintain 
clean air and to forbid such a definition for programs designed to 
improve air quality.”81 In short, the change in agency position was due 
to the activism of the politically divided D.C. Circuit, not the agency 
itself. Justice Stevens was not rejecting the relevance of settled 
expectations in judicial review of agency interpretations; he was 
making the point that if there are no settled expectations, the agency 
should be allowed to experiment with different interpretations that are 
otherwise permissible.  
B. Constitutional Values 
Constitutional values also furnish no reason to fault the Chevron 
decision. With respect to separation of powers values, the relevant 
question is whether the EPA, in embracing the plant-wide 
interpretation of “stationary source,” had exceeded the boundaries of 
its authority established by Congress. The environmental groups that 
had prevailed in the D.C. Circuit argued vigorously that Congress 
intended “stationary source” to mean apparatus and therefore that the 
EPA had exceeded the scope of its delegated authority. Justice 
Stevens, in the body of the opinion, took this claim very seriously. He 
carefully canvassed the relevant statutory provisions and found no 
 
 79.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64. 
 80.  Id. at 856, 864. 
 81.  Id. at 864.  
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“specific definition of the term ‘stationary source,’” at least not in the 
nonattainment provisions.82 There was a definition of “major” 
stationary source, but it did not shed light in any clear fashion on the 
meaning of “source.”83 Nor was there any discussion of the meaning of 
“source” in the legislative history.84 
Turning to the respondent’s specific arguments, Justice Stevens 
noted that the 1970 Clean Air Act did contain a definition of 
“stationary source,” and he thought it was possible that this definition 
was intended to carry over to the same term under the nonattainment 
program. That definition defined “source,” in part, to mean “building,” 
and building “could be read to impose the permit conditions on an 
individual building that is a part of a plant.”85 Justice Stevens then 
noted that sometimes the meanings of words in a series are qualified 
by an associated word in the series, and sometimes a word in a series is 
understood to have “a character of its own,” which is not “submerged 
by its association.”86 Justice Stevens implied that either of these 
conflicting canons of construction could arguably be invoked in parsing 
the definition in the original program, leaving the matter in equipoise. 
Even assuming the second principle of construction was more relevant, 
there was also the oddity that the definition of “major source” under 
the nonattainment program equated “source” with “facility,” which 
presumably has a broader meaning than “building.” He concluded: 
“We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the 
statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress.”87  
This discussion is highly relevant in understanding the role of a 
reviewing court contemplated by the Chevron decision. Justice Stevens 
did not rest with the absence of any specific definition of “source” 
under the nonattainment program. Nor did he resolve the scope of the 
agency’s authority with any casual characterization of the statute as 
“unclear” or “ambiguous.” He carefully reviewed all the relevant 
language, including that of a related provision in the 1970 Act, and 
 
 82.  Id. at 851.  
 83.  Id. at 851, 860.  
 84.  Id. at 851–53. 
 85.  Id. at 860. 
 86.  Id.; see also id. at 860–61 (“[T]he meaning of a word must be ascertained in the context 
of achieving particular objectives, and the words associated with it may indicate that the true 
meaning of the series is to convey a common idea.”). See Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). The second is more obscure, but Stevens cited Russell Motor Car Co. 
v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923), as having adopted it. 
 87.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 861. 
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concluded that Congress did not impose any relevant limit on the 
meaning of “stationary source.” He was committed to determining, 
through the exercise of de novo review, whether Congress had laid 
down a boundary that limited the agency’s authority, or if, to the 
contrary, Congress had left the agency with the space to make a 
discretionary choice.88 
C. Accountability Values 
Chevron is justly famous for its emphatic affirmation of 
accountability values. That affirmation occurred at the end of the 
opinion, once Justice Stevens had established that Congress had no 
“actual intent” about the meaning of “stationary source.” This meant 
that the meaning of “stationary source” was a discretionary policy 
choice that fell within a “gap left open by Congress.”89  
Insofar as filling that gap involved a policy choice, Justice Stevens 
made clear that it should be made by the agency, not the court.90 At the 
end of his opinion, Justice Stevens advanced the critical argument why 
courts should defer to agencies in matters of interpretation that entail 
discretionary policy choices:  
  Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either 
political branch of Government . . . . In contrast, an agency to which 
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the 
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While 
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not 
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with 
the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.91 
 
 88.  This reading is confirmed by an opinion filed by Justice Stevens seven years later in Rust 
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 222 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Dissenting from the majority’s 
invocation of Chevron in upholding an agency regulation, he wrote:  
The new regulations did not merely reflect a change in a policy determination that the 
Secretary had been authorized by Congress to make. Cf. Chevron[, 467 U.S. at 865]. 
Rather, they represented an assumption of policymaking responsibility that Congress 
had not delegated to the Secretary. See id., at 842–843. 
Rust, 500 U.S. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 89.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859–60, 866. 
 90.  Id. at 864. 
 91.  Id. at 865–66. 
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This famous passage is quoted in all excerpts of the decision. Note 
carefully, however, that Justice Stevens qualifies the sphere of agency 
policy choice by noting that Congress must have “delegated 
policymaking responsibilities” to the agency, and the courts must defer 
to the agency when it acts “within the limits of that delegation.” In 
other words, there must be a delegation of authority to the agency, and 
the agency’s sphere of superior accountability is limited by the scope 
of the delegation. Consistent with the discussion of the four values in 
Part I, the operative realm of the accountability value is subordinate to 
the need to maintain the boundaries of agency discretion. 
D. Process Values 
The Chevron decision also includes statements that are consistent 
with ideas sketched in Part I about how judicial review might improve 
the quality of agency statutory interpretation decisions. Justice Stevens 
noted that the plant-wide definition had been adopted by regulation, 
and that, before it was adopted in 1981, “proposals for a plantwide 
definition were considered in at least three formal proceedings.”92 
After summarizing the earlier proceedings, Justice Stevens noted that 
the EPA began by observing that the definitional issue was not 
squarely addressed in either the statute or the legislative history and 
therefore the issue involved an agency “judgment as [to] how to best 
carry out the Act.”93 He then noted that the EPA had offered several 
reasons for concluding that the plant-wide definition was more 
appropriate.94 These conclusions, Justice Stevens observed, were set 
forth in a proposed rulemaking in August 1981 that was formally 
promulgated in October of that year.95  
This description of the EPA’s process established that the Court 
regarded the agency as having determined the meaning of “stationary 
source” through a process that included full disclosure of the agency’s 
reasoning to the public, an opportunity for any interested party to 
comment, and to have—at least ordinarily—an agency response to any 
material comments submitted. 
The Court’s final characterization about the process followed by 
the EPA in rendering its interpretation is also telling. Justice Stevens 
concluded that the EPA’s interpretation “represents a reasonable 
 
 92.  Id. at 853. 
 93.  Id. at 858 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280, 16,281 (Mar. 12, 1981)).  
 94.  Id. at 858–59. 
 95.  Id.  
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accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to 
deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency 
considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the 
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”96 Although this is 
not a complete endorsement of the process-review model—adopted in 
decisions like Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.97—it is fully consistent with, and may 
presuppose the use of, that model. 
In sum, if one were to take a pair of scissors and cut out the first 
paragraphs of Part II of the opinion—and maybe one or two sentences 
in the concluding section that seem to endorse the elimination of any 
constraint on Congress’s power to delegate decisions to administrative 
agencies—one would have an opinion that is almost entirely congruent 
with the four values of judicial review set forth in Part I. The Justices, 
and their law clerks, likely read the opinion this way, assuming they 
plowed their way through the entire draft. Indeed, the Court as a whole 
regarded the decision as an ordinary exercise in judicial review in the 
initial period after it was decided.98 It was the D.C. Circuit, not the 
Court, that decided Part II set forth a new standard of review 
applicable to virtually all judicial challenges to agency statutory 
interpretation decisions.99 Justice Scalia championed the D.C. Circuit’s 
view once he joined the Court, and eventually “the Chevron 
doctrine”—something materially different from the Chevron 
decision—was born.  
III.  THE TWO PARAGRAPHS 
If twenty-six out of twenty-seven pages in the Chevron decision 
are consistent with the four values traced in Part I, where do the 
paragraphs at the beginning of Part II of the Chevron opinion fit into 
the picture? These are the paragraphs that are quoted or paraphrased 
 
 96.  Id. at 865 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 97.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
 98.  Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 981 
(1992) (discussing the initial reception of Chevron by the Supreme Court). 
 99.  The key cases are General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1566–67 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (en banc) and Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). Both decisions were authored by Chief Judge Patricia Wald and were decided roughly 
three months after the Chevron decision was announced. For details about how the Chevron 
doctrine got started in the D.C. Circuit and migrated back to the Supreme Court, see Lawson & 
Kam, supra note 63, at 39–59 and Merrill, Story of Chevron, supra note 63, at 277–82.  
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in casebooks and thousands of later decisions. They constitute what 
came to be known as “the Chevron doctrine.” 
A. The Problematic Aspects of Part II 
The first of these two paragraphs sets forth the “two-step” 
approach to agency interpretations of law. It is quoted here in its 
entirety: 
  When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which 
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question 
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.100  
There are two principal differences between this paragraph and 
what Justice Stevens wrote in the balance of the opinion. First, the 
paragraph asks whether Congress spoke directly to the “precise 
question at issue,” whereas the balance of the opinion asks whether 
Congress left the issue for the agency to determine. This is a subtle but 
important difference. The “precise question” formulation seems to 
charge the reviewing court with finding affirmative evidence of a 
legislative intent in support of a specific interpretation. Such evidence 
will be rare, and therefore the first paragraph seems to imply that the 
agency in nearly all cases will have authority to render a dispositive 
interpretation. The agency, in other words, is given a very large “space” 
in which to interpret, subject only to small pockets where Congress has 
prescribed an answer. In contrast, determining whether Congress left 
the issue for the agency to decide is more consistent with a boundary-
maintenance conception of the role of the reviewing court. This would 
 
 100.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted). The footnotes omitted here proved to 
be important. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987) (“The question 
whether Congress intended the . . . standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory 
construction for the courts to decide . . . . In Chevron . . . we explained: ‘The judiciary is the final 
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which 
are contrary to clear congressional intent.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9)). 
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presumably result in a more confined “space” in which Congress has 
left the agency free to act.  
Second, the opening paragraph advances a rule-like conception of 
the role of the reviewing court, expressed in terms of a sequential 
inquiry—first Step One, then Step Two. The two-step sequence is rule-
like only in the sense that it prescribes a certain ordering of inquiries. 
The substance of the inquiries themselves is not rule-like at all. Rather, 
they describe open-ended standards. The first step examines whether 
Congress had a “clear” or “unambiguous” intent. Clear versus unclear 
and unambiguous versus ambiguous prescribe very general standards 
that require examination of statutory context. The second step asks 
whether the agency interpretation is “permissible,” or as stated in the 
following paragraph, “reasonable.” Permissible versus impermissible 
or reasonable versus unreasonable are also general standards. What 
the first paragraph actually seems to mandate, therefore, is a double 
standard, both prongs of which are quite general.  
That said, the form of the two-step structure is strikingly at odds 
with the remainder of the opinion. If the opening paragraph was 
intended to prescribe a general two-step decisional sequence, one 
would expect to see this process mirrored in the analytical sections of 
the opinion. Instead, the balance of the opinion proceeds in a much 
more conventional fashion, carefully seeking to figure out what 
Congress did and did not decide, and carefully reviewing the course of 
the EPA’s struggle with the issue. Neither the rule-like articulation of 
the sequencing of the decisional process, nor the formulation of the 
steps in terms of clarity and permissibility—or ambiguity and 
reasonableness—make an appearance in the body of the opinion, with 
the exception of Justice Stevens’s conclusion that the EPA’s decision 
to adopt the plant-wide definition was the product of a reasoned 
decisionmaking process. So there is, again, an odd disconnect between 
the first paragraph and the balance of the opinion.  
The second paragraph has received less attention in subsequent 
decisions and commentary. As a matter of jurisprudence, however, it 
is more radical than the first. Again, it is important to quote the text: 
  “The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the 
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 
231 (1974). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate 
a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative 
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regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit 
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.101  
The first three sentences in this paragraph are unproblematic. The 
quotation from Morton v. Ruiz102 says that agencies must act to fill gaps 
left in statutes, whether these gaps are left explicitly or implicitly.103 
This is surely correct, although it says nothing about the standard of 
review courts should apply in reviewing these gap-filling efforts—
something that was not at issue in Ruiz.104 The second sentence says 
that Congress occasionally enacts an express delegation of authority 
directing an agency to interpret a particular term in a statute, which is 
true but unusual. The third says that in reviewing such an express 
delegation for agency interpretation, courts have applied the arbitrary 
and capricious standard, which is what the Court held in Batterton v. 
Francis.105 
More questionable are the fourth and fifth sentences. The fourth 
seems to repeat the point from Ruiz about implicit gaps, but reframes 
it in terms of implicit delegations to interpret, a characterization not 
found in Ruiz. Then comes the final sentence, which seems to say that 
courts should apply the same deferential standard of review to agency 
interpretations of “implicit” delegations as they apply to explicit 
delegations of authority to interpret specific terms. Admittedly, the last 
sentence is not completely clear about this. Saying that courts may not 
substitute their judgment for a “reasonable” agency interpretation is 
not quite the same as saying that courts must uphold agency regulations 
that are not arbitrary and capricious. But most courts and 
commentators have read the last sentence as directing courts to apply 
 
 101.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (footnote omitted). 
 102.  Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
 103.  Id. at 231. 
 104.  Ruiz was concerned with the merits of an agency interpretation and did not discuss the 
standard of review:  
  We are confronted . . . with the issues whether the geographical limitation placed 
on general assistance eligibility by the BIA is consistent with congressional intent and 
the meaning of the applicable statutes, or, to phrase it somewhat differently, whether 
the congressional appropriations are properly limited by the BIA’s restrictions, and, if 
so, whether the limitation withstands constitutional analysis. 
Id. at 209–10. 
 105.  Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424–26 (1977). 
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the same highly deferential standard to “implicit” delegations as they 
apply to explicit delegations.106 
Note carefully, however, that the fourth and fifth sentences do not 
say Congress has implicitly delegated authority to an agency whenever 
a statute is unclear or ambiguous. Lower courts and commentators 
drew this conclusion by reading the description of the two steps in the 
previous paragraph into the point about “implicit” delegations in the 
second.107 But in fact, Justice Stevens says nothing about what sort of 
evidence will suffice to establish that Congress has implicitly delegated 
authority to an agency to interpret a particular provision in its organic 
act.  
Indeed, the interpretation of the second paragraph as endorsing 
the idea that any ambiguity, gap, or silence constitutes an implicit 
delegation of authority to the agency is hardly supported by the 
balance of the opinion. If any ambiguity or lack of clarity constitutes 
an implied delegation of authority to interpret, this would be 
revolutionary. Vague statutory provisions are common. Silences about 
issues that perhaps were not anticipated when the statute was adopted 
are ubiquitous. Inconsistencies and internal tensions abound, 
especially when statutes have been patched together from different 
sources. Ordinary ambiguities are encountered routinely. All these 
situations would qualify as implied delegations of interpretive 
authority to an agency. The balance of the Chevron opinion makes no 
such assumption. Instead, it proceeds on the understanding that the 
definition of “stationary source” must be determined by a careful 
investigation of the relevant text and legislative history of the Clean 
Air Act, which yields the conclusion that the meaning of this term was 
left undecided by Congress, requiring that it be particularized by the 
agency.  
The second paragraph would prove to have significance beyond 
the revolutionary idea that any lack of clarity represents a delegation 
of authority to the agency to interpret. It also contains the seeds of a 
theory that would provide a legal justification for “the Chevron 
doctrine”—that is, the interpretation of the first two paragraphs taken 
out of context from the balance of the opinion. The legal justification 
 
 106.  Indeed, the Court on several occasions has described Step Two of Chevron as requiring 
application of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, which is what the Court said was 
required when reviewing explicit delegations. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011); 
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011); United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
 107.  E.g., Scalia, supra note 77, at 516.  
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is that the strong deference seemingly mandated by the first two 
paragraphs has been directed, if only “implicitly,” by Congress. 
Proponents of this theory, such as Justice Scalia, admitted that any such 
congressional intent is “fictional.”108 Indeed, it was wholly made up. 
Congress has on multiple occasions sought to say the opposite—that 
courts should exercise independent judgment in interpreting agency 
statutes.109 And on one occasion—the enactment of the APA in 1946—
Congress succeeded in legislating this understanding explicitly.110 
Chevron’s greatest weakness as a legal opinion is that it ignores 
this aspect of the APA. However, if any ambiguity is an implicit 
delegation of interpretive authority to agencies, then every time 
Congress enacted an agency statute that contains an ambiguity after 
1946, it impliedly amended the APA. The second paragraph thus 
provided a theory for reconciling “the Chevron doctrine” with the 
APA. It also gave rise to the most important attempt to rein in that 
doctrine, in United States v. Mead Corp.111  
B. Why Did Justice Stevens Start with the Two Paragraphs? 
The question remains why Justice Stevens decided to launch his 
lengthy opinion with these highly novel paragraphs. This is the ultimate 
paradox of the Chevron decision. The opening paragraphs, which are 
the font of “the Chevron doctrine” and are endlessly quoted or 
paraphrased in thousands of decisions, do not appear to reflect the 
 
 108.  As Justice Scalia acknowledged: 
And to tell the truth, the quest for the “genuine” legislative intent is probably a wild-
goose chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases I expect that Congress . . . didn’t think 
about the matter at all. If I am correct in that, then any rule adopted in this field 
represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a 
background rule of law against which Congress can legislate. 
Id. at 517. 
 109.  Prominent examples are the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, S. 909, 116th Cong. 
§  2(2)(B) (2019), which passed the House but not the Senate, and the Bumpers Amendment, S. 
1080, 97th Cong. § 5 (1981), which came close to enactment in the years before Chevron, 128 
Cong. Rec. 5297, 5302 (1982). 
 110.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). Section 706 begins by stating that a “reviewing court shall decide 
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the 
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” Id. On its face, this seems 
unequivocally to instruct courts to apply independent judgment on all questions of law. A 
subsection of § 706 says that the reviewing court shall set aside agency action “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” Id. § 706(2)(C). There 
is ample evidence that Congress prefers that ambiguities be resolved by its faithful agent—the 
courts—rather than by agencies subject to greater influence by its great institutional rival—the 
executive.  
 111.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
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standard of review that Justice Stevens actually applied in the decision 
itself. If courts are always supposed to engage in review using the 
notions advanced in the opening paragraphs, one would surely expect 
these ideas to form the foundation for the analysis in the balance of the 
opinion. Instead, after their appearance in Part II, they effectively 
disappear.  
Although this is necessarily conjectural, Justice Stevens most 
likely authored Part II after he completed the remainder of the opinion. 
The best evidence of this is the very lack of integration in the opinion 
between Part II and the balance of the discussion. If Justice Stevens 
began by drafting the opening paragraphs, with the two-step decisional 
sequence and so forth, one would expect him to apply similar concepts 
in the balance of the opinion. Instead, the opinion contains the multiple 
disconnects previously discussed.  
In addition, Justice Stevens is known to have followed a practice 
of dictating first drafts of his opinions.112 And the balance of the 
opinion reflects this. After the opening paragraphs, the decision reads 
like someone proceeding through familiar steps of statutory analysis 
and recording as he went along. Part III describes the history of the 
Clean Air Act and the features of the Act that led to the adoption of 
the new source review provisions. Part IV discusses the historical 
evolution of the 1977 amendments to the Act. Part V describes the 
internal legislative history of the 1977 amendments insofar as it touches 
on the new source provisions of the nonattainment program. Part VI 
addresses the EPA’s multiple efforts over time to define the meaning 
of “stationary source.” Part VII—the concluding portion of the 
opinion—considers and rejects the respondents’ specific arguments in 
opposition to the plant-wide definition, based on statutory language, 
legislative history, and policy. One can almost picture Justice Stevens 
at his desk, patiently poring through different piles of relevant 
material, and dictating his conclusions after he completed his review of 
each pile. 
Indeed, Justice Harry Blackmun’s notes indicate that at 
conference Justice Stevens said he was “not at rest.”113 Justice Stevens 
had not fully settled on the right answer or approach to the case when 
he was assigned to write the opinion for the Court. For a careful and 
diligent judge like Justice Stevens, the logical thing to do when not at 
 
 112.  Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html [https://perma.cc/MD3Y-MRUZ]. 
 113.  Merrill, Story of Chevron, supra note 63, at 272. 
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rest would be to unravel the pieces of the puzzle, bit by bit, until the 
answer became clear. This surmise is reinforced by two memos Justice 
Stevens wrote to Justice William Brennan after the initial conference 
vote in the case. Justice Brennan, who voted to affirm the D.C. Circuit 
at conference, was hoping that Justice Stevens would adopt an 
approach that would eliminate any need for a dissent in the case. In his 
first response to Justice Brennan, written on March 6, 1984, Justice 
Stevens wrote: “At this point I really am not far enough into the case 
to give you a definitive answer, but I certainly will do my best to 
prepare an opinion that will achieve as broad a consensus as 
possible.”114 In the second memo, dated May 23, 1984, Justice Stevens 
wrote:  
  At long last I have found the time to get back into these cases and 
to begin work on a draft opinion. Since you wrote to me on March 6, 
in the hope that you might be able to escape the chore of writing a 
dissenting opinion if I could see my way clear to accepting your 
approach to the case, I thought I should let you know that I am now 
quite firmly persuaded that the Government is correct in arguing that 
the EPA’s interpretation of the term “source” is permissible.115 
This correspondence confirms that Stevens moved from doubt to 
certainty about the proper outcome as he worked his way through the 
complex materials. The public evidence that he followed such a process 
is found in Parts III–VII of the opinion, which therefore had to be 
drafted first.  
If this conjecture is correct, why then would Justice Stevens, after 
drafting the longest portion of the opinion, turn back and draft the 
short introductory passages that make up Part II? The best explanation 
for this may be the precarious situation in which Justice Stevens found 
himself. Because of recusals, only six Justices were still in the case,116 
two of whom had voted to affirm; the other three, aside from Stevens 
himself, had all indicated varying degrees of uncertainty about the right 
outcome.117 Justice Stevens had convinced himself of the right 
 
 114.  Letter from John Paul Stevens, Assoc. J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr., Assoc. J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. 16 (Mar. 6, 1984), http://supremecourt
opinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1983/82-1005.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF7F-7DQB]. 
 115.  Letter from John Paul Stevens, Assoc. J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr., Assoc. J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. 17 (May 23, 1984), http://supremecourt
opinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1983/82-1005.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF7F-7DQB]. 
 116.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
 117.  Merrill, Story of Chevron, supra note 63, at 273. Justices William Rehnquist and 
Thurgood Marshall were recused for health reasons, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was 
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outcome, but the written evidence of the steps leading to this 
confidence took up some twenty pages in the slip opinion, and required 
attending to a highly technical set of statutory provisions, a convoluted 
administrative history, and an esoteric policy debate. What was needed 
was some arresting language that would grab the reader’s attention and 
suggest that the outcome was compelled by first principles. 
Reduced to their essence, the first two paragraphs are a strong 
invocation, albeit expressed in a novel way, of the distinction between 
law and policy. Courts concern themselves only with enforcing the law; 
policy is for politically accountable institutions like legislatures and 
agencies. The sharp distinction between law and policy resonates 
strongly with lawyers and judges. Justice Stevens, by raising the 
distinction early in the opinion, and concluding with it again at the end, 
was attempting to condition the reader to accept his ultimate 
conclusion: that the definition of stationary source was a policy 
question, not a legal one, and hence one in which the view of the 
administrative agency should be accepted.  
In short, Justice Stevens turned to drafting what became Part II in 
an effort to condense the result of a conventional process of reasoning 
into a set of precepts unconventional enough for readers to sit up and 
take note. In his own mind, Justice Stevens probably saw no 
contradiction between Part II and the balance of the opinion. 
However, by reducing the complexity of his effort to a rule-like 
framework, and invoking a problematic equation of implicit gaps and 
delegations to interpret, Justice Stevens inadvertently produced 
language that could be used by later courts to create something very 
different—something with which Justice Stevens, for one, was deeply 
uncomfortable.118  
IV.  RE-WRITING THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 
Parts II and III of this Article present a re-reading of the Chevron 
decision, and that re-reading provides the foundation for a possible re-
 
recused because of a financial interest in one of the parties. Id. This left only Chief Justice Warren 
Burger and Justices William Brennan, Byron White, Lewis Powell, Harry Blackmun, and John 
Paul Stevens participating. 
 118.  See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (Stevens, J.) (declining to give 
Chevron deference to an agency interpretation about the preemptive effect of a federal statute); 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Stevens, J.) (declining to apply Chevron to a “pure 
question of law”). 
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writing of the Chevron doctrine, without any need to overrule the 
decision. Such a re-writing should entail the following central points. 
The paragraphs of Part II of the Chevron decision must be read in 
the context of the opinion as a whole. When so read, Part II establishes 
two critical propositions, which are sound and should be reaffirmed: 
1. If a reviewing court determines, using the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation, that a statute has a clear or 
unambiguous meaning, that meaning must be enforced, 
notwithstanding any agency interpretation to the contrary. 
This understanding is required by rule-of-law values and by 
the separation of powers principle of legislative supremacy. 
2. If a reviewing court determines, using the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation, that Congress has expressly or 
impliedly delegated authority to the agency to fill a gap or 
space in the statute, the agency interpretation should be 
reviewed in a manner similar to the way courts review agency 
policy determinations more generally under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of the APA. This is required by 
understanding that the agency, because of its political 
accountability and expertise, is the preferred institution for 
resolving questions of discretionary policy.  
The balance of the Chevron decision, found in Parts III–VII, 
either establishes or is consistent with the following propositions: 
3. The Chevron decision did not hold that settled expectations 
created by prior agency action are irrelevant in reviewing an 
agency’s exercise of interpretative authority. The Court found 
that prior legislative and administrative action had not created 
any settled expectations. Many decisions before and after 
Chevron reaffirm that settled expectations created by 
contemporary or longstanding agency understanding of its 
statutory mandate are relevant in reviewing agency 
interpretations of law. Giving weight to such expectations is 
required by rule-of-law values. 
4. In speaking of implied delegations of interpretative authority, 
the Court did not suggest that any silence, gap, or ambiguity 
in a statute automatically constitutes a delegation of 
interpretive authority to the agency. The reviewing court must 
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determine, as a matter of independent judgment using the 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether Congress 
has left space for the agency to fill in the exercise of delegated 
authority. Only after determining that the best reading of the 
statute is that Congress actually intended the agency to 
exercise discretionary interpretive authority should the 
reviewing court accept the agency’s interpretation. This is 
required by constitutional values—most prominently, the anti-
inherency understanding of the principle of legislative 
supremacy.  
5. When a reviewing court concludes that the agency 
interpretation is consistent with settled expectations and falls 
within the delegated space created by Congress where the 
agency is to exercise interpretive authority, the agency 
interpretation should be reviewed like other exercises of 
delegated policymaking authority. This is required by 
considerations of comparative institutional analysis—namely, 
that the agency is a superior institution for establishing policy 
on grounds of political accountability and expertise. 
6. A critical element in exercising the review of such 
discretionary agency interpretations, as is required for any 
exercise of review if an agency has discretionary policymaking 
authority, is whether the agency developed its position 
through a process of reasoned decisionmaking. Typically, this 
entails providing notice, an opportunity to object, and an 
explanation by the agency for rejecting any plausible 
alternatives or objections deemed significant.  
This does not exhaust the elements the Court should draw upon 
in re-writing the Chevron doctrine. As in Kisor v. Wilkie,119 where the 
Court re-wrote the Auer doctrine,120 the Court should draw from 
additional elements as well.  
 
 119.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 120.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1945). Auer required that courts give “controlling” 
weight to an agency interpretation of their own regulations unless it is “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). Kisor declined to overrule Auer, but recognized six 
qualifications to its standard of review, most of which were drawn from prior precedent. Kisor, 
139 S. Ct. at 2415–18. 
MERRILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:10 PM 
1194  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1153 
The APA, which was ignored in Chevron and in most of the later 
cases invoking the Chevron doctrine, provides powerful support for 
this re-writing. As Professor Henry Monaghan explained years ago, 
deferring to agency interpretations of law when Congress actually 
intends that the agency should serve as the primary interpreter is fully 
consistent with the Act’s general instruction to courts to “decide all 
relevant questions of law.”121 By deferring to the agency interpretation, 
the court is following the law. But it is inconsistent with the APA to 
defer to the agency regarding the scope of its own authority. The APA 
instructs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is 
“in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right.”122 As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, in dissent, in 
City of Arlington v. FCC123: 
Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of law when and because 
Congress has conferred on the agency interpretive authority over the 
question at issue. An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority 
until it has it; the question whether an agency enjoys that authority 
must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency.124  
The APA requires this much. The discovery, if belated, of a conflict 
between judge-made doctrine and a controlling statute fully justifies 
making appropriate qualifications to the doctrine. 
The Court can also draw on aspects of its Chevron jurisprudence, 
such as the decisions that continue to emphasize the importance of 
longstanding and consistent agency interpretations,125 the decisions 
that interpret Mead as requiring an all-things-considered inquiry into 
whether Congress actually intended the agency to exercise delegated 
interpretive authority,126 and the decisions that decline to apply the 
 
 121.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018); see Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1983).  
 122.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). 
 123. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013). 
 124. Id. at 312 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 125. See generally Krishnakumar, supra note 65 (collecting decisions referencing the duration 
of an agency interpretation in considering whether deference is appropriate). 
 126. See Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173–74 (2007); Barnhart v. 
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). Although Mead instructed that the Chevron doctrine should 
apply only when an agency had made its interpretation pursuant to delegated authority to act with 
the force of law, United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001), this is inadequate to 
ensure that the agency is acting within the scope of its delegated authority. The question of agency 
authority exists along two dimensions. One is whether Congress has given the agency the 
authority to act with the force of law. The other is whether Congress has given the agency the 
authority to decide the particular question presented. It is quite possible to imagine an agency 
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Chevron doctrine where the agency has failed to follow a reasoned 
decisionmaking process.127  
In short, it is well within the capacities of the Justices to reform 
the Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron decision. They 
can do so by emphasizing the analysis set forth in the body of the 
Chevron opinion, by emphasizing the importance of the judicial-review 
provisions of the APA, and by drawing upon qualifications introduced 
in post-Chevron decisions.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has advanced one simple idea about how to revise the 
Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron decision. Ignoring 
the provocative paragraphs in Part II of the decision and concentrating 
instead on the balance of the opinion, the Chevron decision is highly 
consistent with four important values that should inform judicial 
review of agency interpretations of law. Those are rule-of-law values, 
constitutional values including the principle of legislative supremacy, 
the desirability of accepting agency decisions that reflect discretionary 
policy choices, and the importance of reasoned decisionmaking by 
agencies. While the body of the Chevron opinion reflects these values 
well, the Chevron doctrine, which was created by reading two 
introductory paragraphs of the opinion out of context, reflects these 
values poorly. The first step to reform the Chevron doctrine is to re-
read the Chevron decision, concentrating on the body of the opinion 
 
that is given authority to act with the force of law (for example, to issue binding regulations 
governing the marketing of drugs and medical devices) but is not given authority over a particular 
set of issues (for example, to regulate tobacco products). See FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156 (2000). Conversely, it is possible to imagine an agency that is 
given authority over a particular set of issues (for example, to make sure employees get paid time 
and a half for overtime) but not given authority to act with the force of law with respect to those 
issues (for example, to bring an enforcement action before the agency when a violation is 
suspected). See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). The principle of legislative 
supremacy requires that both types of limits be enforced. 
 127. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016) (refusing to 
give Chevron deference to an agency interpretation that failed to explain its departure from 
previous interpretations); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (refusing to apply the 
Chevron doctrine in part because the agency had not provided any notice of its interpretation 
before it was adopted). For recent decisions applying a robust version of the reasoned 
decisionmaking norm, see Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of 
California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910–15 (2020) (invalidating the rescission of a policy statement for 
failure to consider alternatives), and Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–
76 (2019) (invalidating an order from the secretary of commerce based on a finding that his stated 
rationale was “pretextual”).  
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and interpreting the paragraphs setting forth the two-step approach in 
light of that analysis. Starting with this foundation, the process of 
articulating a better deference doctrine should be attainable. 
